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POLICE BARGAINING DISPUTES AND 
THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN 
AUSTRALIA: WHICH WAY FORWARD? 
GIUSEPPE CARABETTA∗ 
The essential duties that police officers perform, and the absence of a right 
to strike, creates the need for an effective, impartial procedure for the 
resolution of bargaining disputes. This article argues that, with the shift of 
focus under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) to good-faith bargaining, police 
officers have been left without an effective dispute resolution mechanism, 
partly because of the limitations on arbitration but also because of 
uncertainties surrounding the scope of the ‘protected action’ provisions of 
the Act for police officers. Following a review of police pay-setting 
arrangements in comparable jurisdictions, this article examines and 
proposes options for an alternative model, including a mandatory ‘final-
offer’ arbitration (‘FOA’) model as used for police bargaining in Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States. Research shows that — aside from 
providing an effective closure mechanism for bargaining disputes where 
strikes or lock-outs are unavailable — mandatory FOA offers a range of 
benefits to police bargaining, and could provide an ideal ‘fit’ for the 
current bargaining-centred system. The article’s findings are of 
significance not only to police officers, but to all emergency services 
workers covered by the Fair Work bargaining regime.  
I INTRODUCTION  
The unique and essential duties which law enforcement officers perform, and 
the absence of a legal and moral right to strike, creates the need for an 
alternative effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes. This 
alternative measure is needed both to safeguard police officers’ interests and 
to protect the community from the flow-on harms of long-running workplace 
disputes.1 Police officers in Australia have long had access to such a measure 
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1 Cf Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero and Horacio Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning the 
Right to Strike’ (1998) 137(4) International Labour Review 441, 453. As noted in Part II, 
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in the form of binding arbitration for pay disputes — specifically, compulsory 
arbitration under the conciliation and arbitration systems of the general 
industrial relations Acts.2 A key feature of these systems for police, as with 
the pay-setting models of comparable jurisdictions, has been the right to 
collectively bargain over employment conditions supported by the availability 
of arbitration to bring closure to negotiations that do not settle.3 However, as 
has been highlighted now by a number of Australian pay disputes,4 with the 
shift of focus under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) from arbitration 
to enterprise bargaining, there is now limited scope for compulsory arbitration 
of bargaining disputes. Furthermore, while other occupational groups are 
afforded the right to take protected industrial action in support of bargaining 
claims under this system, police officers have a limited ability to utilise these 
aspects of the new regime.  
This article originates from an earlier research proposal5 examining options 
for the development of a new pay-setting model for police in Australia. The 
article argues that the shift to a good-faith bargaining regime premised on the 
right to strike has created uncertainty and potential instability in police 
industrial relations.6 While there have been calls for a re-examination of the 
current model for all workers,7 Part II of the article argues that, for police and 
other emergency service workers, there are especially pressing needs to 
consider an alternative approach. Part III reviews the principal police pay-
                                                                                                                    
strictly speaking, this represents the position of the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’) 
in relation to essential services and public employees, police being excluded from these 
categories. See further text accompanying n 38 below. 
2 See Giuseppe Carabetta, ‘Fair Work and the Future of Police Industrial Regulation in 
Australia’ (2011) 24(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 260, 265–6. 
3 Ibid.  
4 See, in particular, the Qantas, Victorian nurses, Victorian public sector, and Cochlear disputes 
in 2011–12. See also Anthony Forysth, ‘Qantas Case Shows the Need for Interest 
Arbitration’, The Conversation (online) 28 November 2011 <http://theconversation.com 
/qantas-case-shows-the-need-for-interest-arbitration-4436>; Justice Roger Boland, ‘Some 
Current Matters of Interest’ (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Industrial 
Relations Society of NSW, Kiama, 18 May 2012).  
5 Giuseppe Carabetta and Joellen Riley, Employment and the Law in Australian Policing: 
Options for the Development of a New Police Industrial Relations Law Model, Australian 
Research Council Linkage Grant proposal, University of Sydney, submitted 17 November 
2010. Despite receiving a very favourable assessor’s report and government support, this 
proposal was ultimately unsuccessful. 
6 The FW Act currently applies only to members of the Australian Federal Police and the 
Victoria Police. However, with the advent of a national unitary industrial relations system, the 
Fair Work regime potentially affects other Australian jurisdictions also: See Carabetta, ‘Fair 
Work’, above n 2, 266. 
7 See, in particular, Forsyth, above n 4; Anthony Forsyth and Andrew Stewart, Submission to 
the Fair Work Act Review Panel, Fair Work Act Review, February 2012; see further Boland, 
above n 4.  
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setting models and experiences of comparable overseas jurisdictions — the 
United Kingdom (‘UK’), the United States (‘US’), New Zealand, and Canada. 
It is shown that, despite having a variety of approaches to the rules governing 
bargaining and third-party intervention, those jurisdictions with established 
police bargaining systems have, unlike Australia, robust regulatory measures 
in place as a counterbalance to the loss of the right to strike. Part IV of this 
article examines the principal options for an alternative model, including 
options for a model based on mandatory ‘final-offer’ arbitration (‘FOA’), as 
well as some of the potential challenges and obstacles for the introduction of a 
new model.  
II THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
Major ILO conventions which promote collective bargaining acknowledge the 
acceptability of restricting the right of police officers to engage in collective 
bargaining and to strike. The ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association,8 
in article 9, and the ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining,9 in article 5, provide:  
1. The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall 
apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national 
laws or regulations.10  
It would therefore not seem contrary to ILO standards to restrict the collective 
bargaining rights of police, including the right to strike. However, if police 
officers operate under a generalised collective bargaining model along with 
other employees, it seems reasonable to argue that they ought to enjoy the 
same compensatory measures as other employees in a bargaining context.11 
                                                 
8 Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (ILO 
Convention 87), opened for signature 9 July 1948, 68 UNTS 17 (entered into force 4 July 
1950). 
9 Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively (ILO Convention 98), opened for signature 1 July 1949, 96 UNTS 257 
(entered into force 18 July 1951).  
10 The same qualification is applied in the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 
opened for signature 27 June 1978 (entered into force 25 February 1981) art 1(3) and the 
Convention concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining (ILO Convention 154), 
opened for signature 3 June 1981, 1331 UNTS 267 (entered into force 11 August 1983) 
art 1(2). While there is no direct reference to the right to strike in the relevant ILO 
conventions, this right has been inferred by the supervisory bodies.  
11 A similar approach to the ILO’s standards vis-à-vis police officers has been applied in other 
contexts: see, eg, In the Matter of an Interest Arbitration Between The Durham Regional 
Police Association and The Regional Municipality of Durham Police Services Board 
(Preliminary Award, Paula Knopf, 13 July 2007) [76] <http://www.policearbitration. 
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Thus, in relation to essential service and public employees, the ILO 
Committee of Experts has said: 
[I]f strikes are restricted or prohibited in the public services or in essential 
services, appropriate guarantees must be afforded to protect workers who 
are thus denied one of the essential means of defending their occupational 
interests. Restrictions should be offset by adequate impartial and speedy 
conciliation and arbitration procedures, in which the parties concerned can 
take part at every stage and in which the awards should in all cases be 
binding on both parties. Such awards, once rendered, should be rapidly and 
fully implemented.12  
In other words, the removal of the right to strike is to be counter-balanced by 
a fair and impartial conciliation and arbitration system. By analogy, it would 
seem valid to treat police officers in the same manner.13  
The general position in Australia has been that police officers have been 
subject to formal prohibitions on striking. These prohibitions have ranged 
from direct bans on industrial action under the Police Acts and regulations to 
more general restrictions under essential services provisions.14 However, 
while police in Australia have been subject to formal restrictions on striking, 
they have had access to binding arbitration procedures for the resolution of 
pay disputes — normally under the generalised industrial relations Acts 
applicable to all employees.15 An important feature of these models has been 
the right to collectively bargain supported by (conventional) compulsory 
arbitration. However, as has now been made clear by a number of high-profile 
                                                                                                                    
on.ca/content/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@opac/documents/awards/07-008.pdf>; 
see further below n 16. 
12 ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, 69th session, International Labour Office, Geneva (1983) pt IV(B), 66. See 
further Gernigon et al, above n 1, 453. 
13 R J Hawke, ‘Do Police Have Industrial Muscle?’ in K T Serong (ed), Police Industrial 
Relations Seminar (Abaris Printing and Publishing Co, 1982) 98. The balancing role provided 
by arbitration in the police context is often acknowledged in policy discussions on police 
industrial regulation. 
14 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 263 citing as examples the Police Service 
Administration Regulations 1990 (Qld) reg 5.3 and the Essential Services Act 1988 (NSW) 
and Essential Services Act 1958 (Vic). For an example of a direct ban on police strikes in 
circumstances where other employees are afforded a right to protected industrial action, see 
Explanatory Memorandum, Police Service Administration Amendment Bill 2002 (Qld) 1, the 
object of which was ‘to place beyond doubt that a police officer must not ... engage in conduct 
that, if engaged in by 2 or more officers, would be a strike’.  
15 Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 265–6; K D Marshall, ‘Survival Within the Arbitration 
System’ in K T Serong (ed), Police Industrial Relations Seminar (Abaris Printing and 
Publishing Co, 1982) 105. 
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disputes,16 under the current FW Act, there is limited scope for arbitration of 
bargaining disputes, including police bargaining disputes.17 Importantly, the 
current good faith bargaining framework does not provide for situations where 
the parties have reached a bargaining impasse. Further, because the current 
‘tests’ for arbitration — including those for good-faith bargaining breaches — 
are so difficult to satisfy, intractable long-running disputes may continue 
indefinitely.18 This has prompted some commentators, particularly Professor 
Forsyth, to ask whether the rules for access to arbitration under the FW Act 
need re-examining.19  
In addition, while employees are afforded only a limited right to take 
protected action in support of bargaining claims (and employers are afforded 
the right to ‘lock out’) under the Fair Work model,20 for police officers, there 
are additional limitations in utilising this aspect of the bargaining regime. For 
one thing, as the writer has shown elsewhere,21 there are unresolved questions 
surrounding the scope and validity of the ‘protected action’ provisions of the 
FW Act for law enforcement officers, particularly state law enforcement 
officers. A significant reason for this is the apparent conflict between the 
protected action provisions on the one hand, and the relevant Police Act and 
police officers’ oath of office on the other.22 Further, it may be doubted how 
access to those provisions may be effectively used by police in a bargaining 
context when, by definition, almost any industrial action by them would be a 
threat to personal health and safety and so might lead to a termination or 
suspension order under the Act.23 It is true that there is a propensity for 
Australian police and their associations to engage in ‘lesser’ forms of 
industrial pressure tactics short of striking.24 Such limited actions (working-
to-rule, bans on speeding or traffic infringements, and the like) would seem 
                                                 
16 For example, the Qantas and Victorian Nursing disputes in 2011–12, both intractable 
disputes concerning complex employment matters, and both causing significant disruptions to 
sections of the community; see Forsyth, above n 4; Boland, above n 4, [16]–[27]. 
17 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 268–71. 
18 Forsyth, above n 4; Forsyth and Stewart, above n 7, 22–8; Boland, above n 4, [16]–[39]. 
Justice Boland, speaking extra-judicially, referred specifically to the long-running Victorian 
nurses dispute in 2011–12. 
19 Forsyth, above n 4. As discussed further below, Professor Forsyth argues that there are 
‘compelling international examples’ of how interest arbitration, including mandatory interest 
arbitration often used for public sector employment in the United States, could provide a 
solution to collective bargaining impasses.  
20 Shae McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia (The Federation Press, 2010). 
21 Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 268–9. 
22 Ibid. 
23 A view supported by Justice Boland, above n 4, [26] referring, in the context of the Victorian 
nurses dispute, to emergency services workers generally. 
24 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 265; see further text accompanying n 70 below. 
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allowable under the protected action provisions of the FW Act,25 and can be 
an effective form of bargaining pressure. However, such actions are 
essentially an escalation of bargaining pressure; they do not guarantee closure 
to bargaining disputes.26 They cannot therefore be a substitute for other 
closure mechanisms in resolving bargaining impasses. 
A related issue that impacts on police bargaining under the FW Act concerns 
the exclusion of a number of police matters from the bargaining framework. 
‘Command’ matters (discipline, transfers, promotions and a range of other 
significant matters)27 are excluded from bargaining for operational efficiency 
reasons.28 This has two main effects: (1) it limits the range of matters that may 
be the subject of bargaining and arbitration for police; and (2) it limits the 
matters that may be appealed or reviewed under the Act. In one sense, the 
limitations may make it easier for the parties to successfully reach agreement 
because there is simply less to disagree over.29 Further, a number of the 
excluded matters are otherwise governed by the ‘detailed paternalistic code’30 
that regulates police employment. Despite this ‘code’, however, significant 
matters have been excluded from the FW Act without any alternative 
compensatory provisions being introduced.31 This has forced parties to look to 
alternative means of managing their affairs. However, the problem with such 
‘side deals’ is that they do not provide the parties with sufficient certainty that 
their rights are enforceable.32  
                                                 
25 On the assumption, that is, that these provisions validly apply to police officers covered by 
the Act. 
26 Ian McAndrew, ‘An Examination of Police Pay Setting Systems with Particular 
Consideration of the Right to Strike and of Models of Arbitration’ (Unpublished Briefing 
Paper Prepared for the New Zealand Police Association, NZ Mediators, 2006) 4, 34 
(‘McAndrew Review’). Nor, based on previous case law, would such limited matters be 
sufficient of themselves to satisfy the public health and safety test for arbitration. 
27 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 271–5, outlining the current exclusions in relation to 
the Australian Federal Police and the Victoria Police. 
28 See Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, The 
Provisions of the Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Bill 1999 (1999) [2.15]–
[2.22]. 
29 Studies in the US have shown that the limiting of arbitral subjects impedes effective 
government and employee performance (discussed further below). 
30 D C Thomson, ‘Employment and the Law in the New South Wales Police Force’ (1963) 4 
Sydney Law Review 404, 404.  
31 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 274–6. 
32 Ibid 279. The intended scope of the exclusions has also been a major area of contention 
between the parties, producing further complexities: at 274. 
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III POLICE PAY-SETTING INTERNATIONALLY 
In a comprehensive review of police pay-setting systems in the UK, 
continental Europe, North America and Australia,33 Ian McAndrew points out 
that of the jurisdictions with bi-lateral police pay-setting, the common pay-
setting mechanism is collective bargaining.34 Furthermore, in most cases, the 
laws providing for collective bargaining also require certain forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, primarily in the form of conciliation or 
mediation to assist parties unable to reach an agreed settlement.35 
Significantly, however — unlike Australia — many jurisdictions do not have 
a strong tradition of compulsory arbitration for police pay-setting. McAndrew 
notes that in much of Europe, for example, there is no guaranteed closure 
mechanism for police collective bargaining.36 Instead, bargaining ‘relies on a 
propensity to bargain to consensus, grounded in traditions of social 
partnership’, and on police unions’ strong political links.37 Similarly, in the 
US, as will be noted presently, compulsory arbitration is especially prevalent 
amongst police and other essential service workers, the rationale for which is 
the desire to prevent strikes that may be harmful to the public interest.38 
However, in some US states where police are granted bargaining rights, there 
is a form of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, but no binding 
arbitration.39  
                                                 
33 McAndrew Review, above n 26. The purpose of the McAndrew Review was to provide a 
survey on police pay-setting models in other relevant police jurisdictions, ‘focusing in 
particular on the question of the right to strike and the role, if any, that it plays in police pay-
setting elsewhere’: at 5. 
34 Ibid 32. Many police officers across the world — in parts of Africa, South America, many 
(mainly Southern) US States, and elsewhere — have their employment conditions determined 
unilaterally by governments, or individual police agencies; while others, even in countries 
with strong traditions of democracy, are expressly denied the right to bargain (eg the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police): at 31. It is also worth noting that among public emergency 
services, including police services, there is a wide variety of rules and limitations governing 
collective bargaining, including its scope, the levels at which it can take place, and limits on 
third-party intervention: ILO, Public Emergency Services: Social Dialogue in a Changing 
Environment, International Labour Office, Geneva (2003) (‘ILO Public Emergency Services’) 
98 <http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2002/102B09_313_engl.pdf>. 
35 McAndrew Review, above n 26, 32. This is the case even in European countries where police 
officers have a right to strike: at 19–20. 
36 Ibid 19–20, citing the examples of Germany and the Netherlands. 
37 Ibid 32. 
38 Gale Encyclopedia of US History, ‘Arbitration’ (online) Answers.com <www.answers.com 
/topic/arbitration> cited in Boland, above n 4, 14. 
39 McAndrew Review, above n 26, 32; Mike Carrell and Richard Bales, ‘Considering Final 
Offer Arbitration to Resolve Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession Bargaining’ 
(2012) 28(1) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 17 <http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2000185>. 
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In other jurisdictions however — particularly Canada, New Zealand, a 
number of US states, and the UK — the right of the police to bargain is 
supported by compulsory arbitration designed to bring closure to bargaining 
disputes that do not settle.40 As already noted, the policy rationale for the 
availability of compulsory arbitration, in lieu of a right to strike, is two-
pronged: to safeguard police officers’ industrial interests; and to protect the 
community from the consequent harms of police workplace disputes. 
Legislators have expressed the policy reasoning as follows:  
Recognizing the unique and essential duties which law enforcement officers 
and firefighters perform for the benefit and protection of the people of this 
State, cognizant of the life threatening dangers these public servants 
regularly confront in the daily pursuit of their public mission, and fully 
conscious of the fact that these public employees, by legal and moral 
precept, do not enjoy the right to strike, it is … requisite to the high morale 
of such employees, the efficient operation of such departments, and to the 
general well-being and benefit of the citizens of this State to afford an 
alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of 
disputes.41  
Access to arbitration is approached in varying ways both across and within 
jurisdictions. The variations are based on considerations such as whether 
arbitration is to apply after periods of conciliation, or after mediation and/or 
fact finding has proved unsuccessful, or on other bases.42 The Ontario Police 
Services Act 1990, for example, provides that: 
• If conciliation fails, the parties can jointly agree on an 
arbitrator/arbitration board, or one will be appointed by the Chair of 
the Police Arbitration Commission.  
• The default method of arbitration is mediation–arbitration — whereby 
the mediator-arbitrator attempts to mediate, but has authority to 
determine outstanding matters by arbitration.  
                                                 
40 As noted below, this statement requires qualification in a number of significant respects, 
including issues relating to the role of the arbitrator in pay disputes. 
41 This extract is taken from the New Jersey Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub L No 425, NJ Stat Ann, 34:13A–14, which established a specialist process 
for compulsory interest arbitration for both law enforcement officers and fire fighters. 
42 See generally, McAndrew Review, above n 26, 15–28; see also Robert J Martin, ‘Fixing the 
Fiscal Police and Firetrap: A Critique of New Jersey’s Compulsory Interest Arbitration Act’ 
(1993) 18 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 59. In some cases, binding arbitration applies even 
in instances where the parties choose not to invoke alternative dispute resolution procedures 
such as mediation. 
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• In the arbitration stage, the arbitrator decides by FOA, selecting a 
final offer from either party on an ‘issue-by-issue’ or ‘total package’ 
basis.  
• In lieu of the default process, the Chair of the Arbitration Commission 
can direct that the dispute be resolved by mediation–final offer 
arbitration, FOA or by conventional arbitration if he or she deems it 
appropriate having regard to the nature of the dispute.43  
A range of arbitration methods is used in the various jurisdictions — 
including conventional arbitration, FOA and mediation–arbitration44 — and, 
as noted by McAndrew, the arbitrator is drawn from a variety of sources, and 
may be a single arbitrator or a panel, either tripartite or wholly neutral.45 FOA 
(and an absolute ban on strikes) exists for police in parts of Canada, in New 
Zealand, and in some US states. It was introduced originally in the US and 
Canada, primarily in the police and fire services, once again reflecting the 
need to prevent the high cost of strikes in these sectors.46 In contrast to 
conventional arbitration, where the arbitrator has complete discretion to 
determine the dispute within formal parameters, under FOA the arbitrator 
must choose one of the unalterable offers of one of the parties — either on 
each issue or an overall ‘package’ basis — based on the elements of each 
party’s final proposals.47 As discussed below, FOA can offer the advantages 
of conventional arbitration in providing a guaranteed closure mechanism, 
while simultaneously avoiding the perils of conventional arbitration. In 
particular, FOA aims to address the ‘chilling effect’ common in conventional 
arbitration by encouraging the parties to present more reasonable, middle-
ground offers. 
Mediation–arbitration (or ‘Med–Arb’), used in various forms in Canada, the 
US and New Zealand, normally involves combining mediation and arbitration 
while utilising the same person as mediator and arbitrator — the aim being to 
combine the advantages of the two processes. An example is the Ontario 
                                                 
43 See Police Services Act, RSO 1990, pt VIII, ss 119–22.  
44 This range of arbitration models applies across both the US and the Canadian provinces: 
McAndrew Review, above n 26, 20, 26. 
45 Ibid 32. McAndrew notes that in the US, where states have regulated police labour relations 
systems, there is frequent use of mediation via state or private services and often some form 
of arbitration commonly performed by agreed or appointed private arbitrators. These systems 
are generally administered by a state public employment relations body and modelled on the 
National Labor Relations Board that administers private sector bargaining under the National 
Labor Relations Act 29 USC §§ 151–69: at 24. 
46 Amy Lok, ‘Final-Offer Arbitration’ (2008) 10(4) Australian Dispute Resolution Bulletin 61, 
62 <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol10/iss4/1>. 
47 Ibid. 
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Police model, where the neutral person first attempts to mediate a settlement 
but, failing that, determines the remaining issues by arbitration. A variation is 
provided by the New Zealand Police model.48 If the parties are unable to 
reach a resolution during ‘informal negotiation’, both a mediator and 
arbitrator attend ‘formal negotiation’ during which the arbitrator is able to 
provide feedback and indicate his or her ‘leaning’ on the parties’ respective 
proposals.49 Arbitration is on a final-offer package basis, and the parties are 
able to modify their positions following a formal arbitration hearing. In a 
2012 study of this model, McAndrew found that a perceived advantage of 
having the arbitrator present during mediation is that she/he develops a better 
understanding of the issues and is able to better focus the negotiations.50 At 
the same time, the arbitrator is able to steer the parties by signalling whether 
or not he or she is impressed by what is being proposed and by asking the 
parties questions about the basis of their positions.51  
The criteria guiding arbitrators often cover a range of factors. The capacity of 
the employer to pay is the most frequently applied criterion.52 Others include 
the public interest, wage comparability, and productivity improvements. The 
New Jersey Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act requires 
the arbitrator to give due weight to nine factors: (1) the interests and welfare 
of the public; (2) wage comparability; (3) the overall level of benefits 
presently received by the police or fire fighting employees; (4) the stipulations 
of the parties; (5) the lawful authority of the employer; (6) the financial 
impact of a particular award on the municipality, its residents, and its 
taxpayers; (7) cost of living changes; (8) the continuity and stability of 
employment; and (9) statutory restrictions imposed on the employer.53 The 
                                                 
48 See Ian McAndrew, ‘Final-Offer Arbitration: A New Zealand Variation’ (2003) 42(4) 
Industrial Relations 736, 736. The current model is established under the Policing Act 2008 
(NZ), providing for a bargaining impasse procedure in the form of FOA; the parties 
themselves, however, have designed and ‘moulded’ their own Police Negotiations 
Framework. 
49 Ian McAndrew, ‘Collective Bargaining Interventions: Contemporary New Zealand 
Experiments’ (2012) 23(2) The International Journal of Human Resource Management 495, 
495–510. 
50 Ibid 500. 
51 Ibid 500–1. McAndrew explains that under the original model, the arbitrator could present an 
actual ‘interim decision’ before issuing a final decision if required. However, while this 
feature was viewed as a stimulus to further bargaining, it was also felt it had a ‘chilling’ effect 
that had preceded the interim decision. Accordingly, the framework was modified to allow the 
parties to ask the arbitrator to informally provide their ‘leaning’ at any stage: at 499.  
52 McAndrew Review, above n 26, 16, 23, 26, 30. As noted below, growing concerns over 
‘fiscal responsibility’ and reductions in tax revenue has meant the employer’s capacity to pay 
has assumed an ever greater significance. 
53 Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 425, NJ Stat 
Ann, 34: 13A–16(g). 
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significance of each criterion depends on the contested issues and evidence 
presented. A similar approach is followed in other specialist police arbitration 
systems.54 In some jurisdictions, the qualifications required for, and the nature 
of, police work are considered,55 while in New Zealand, the arbitrator must 
consider ‘the special conditions applicable to employment in the Police, 
including the prohibition on strikes by constables’.56  
In addition to the above observations, three other key features of the current 
police bargaining and arbitration models must be noted. These features 
significantly limit normal bargaining, and give the employer distinct 
advantages in relation to the determination of employment conditions. First, in 
some cases, as in Australia, some matters are excluded from the bargaining 
framework.57 These restrictions significantly limit, purportedly for public 
policy reasons, the role of the arbitrator in the determination of police 
employment conditions. The extent of the exclusions varies between 
jurisdictions, and in some cases there are no restrictions.58 However, in some 
cases, the arbitrator must have regard to such matters as the Commissioner or 
responsible minister considers relevant.59 It is highly unusual that a party to 
supposedly neutral and fair arbitration has the power to unilaterally impose 
criteria on the arbitrator in this way.60  
Secondly, growing concerns with ‘ability to pay’ considerations in recent 
years have seen further employer predominance in the pay determination 
                                                 
54 See, eg, Police Services Act, RSO 1990 pt VIII s 122(5); Fire and Police Services Collective 
Bargaining Act, RSBC 1996, c 142, s 4(6); Policing Act 2008 (NZ) sch 2 s 5. 
55 For example, Fire and Police Services Collective Bargaining Act, RSBC 1996, c 142 
s 4(6)(d); Policing Act 2008 (NZ) sch 2 s 5(b)(c). 
56 Policing Act 2008 (NZ) sch 2 s 5(f). 
57 ILO Public Emergency Services, above n 34, 98–9, noting policing as the common example 
for such limitations. 
58 For example, there are currently no such restrictions in New Zealand: Ian McAndrew, 
‘“Med-Arb” in the New Zealand Police’ in William K Roche, Paul Teague and Alex Colvin 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Conflict Management in Organizations (Oxford University Press, 
2013) (forthcoming).  
59 See, eg, Fire and Police Services Collective Bargaining Act, RSBC 1996, c 142 s 4(6)(f), 
providing that the arbitrator must give regard to ‘any terms of reference specified by the 
minister ...’. This provision has been interpreted as conceivably involving a direction to give 
certain arbitration criteria under the Act more weight than others, or to specify new factors: 
see City of Vancouver v Vancouver Fire Fighters’ Union, International Association of Fire 
Fighters (Collective Agreement Interest Arbitration, John B Hall, 22 March 2012).  
60 Gordon Anderson, ‘Proposed Changes to the Arbitration Regime under the Police Act 
(Police Amendment No 2) Bill 2001’ (Advice Prepared for the New Zealand Police 
Association, 28 August 2001) referring to the position under the previous New Zealand Police 
Act 1958 (NZ) sch 3 cl 24(g) providing that the arbitrator had to consider ‘such other matters 
as the Commissioner … considers relevant’. The police association now has the same right to 
raise additional matters under the Policing Act 2008 (NZ) sch 2 cl 5(g).  
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process. In the UK, for example, if the parties fail to reach resolution, the 
matter may be referred to the Police Arbitration Tribunal. The awards of the 
tribunal, however, are treated as agreements of the Police Negotiation Board 
(‘PNB’), which in turn are recommendations to the Home Secretary, the 
Northern Ireland Secretary and Scottish ministers.61 The Home Secretary has 
on occasion rejected recommendations of the arbitral tribunal for budgetary 
reasons.62  
Thirdly, and most significantly, a number of jurisdictions — led by several 
US states — have recently enacted or are considering controversial measures 
limiting or eliminating public sector bargaining, on the ground that it has 
contributed to public deficit crises.63 The measures limit the scope of 
bargaining, the enforceability of agreements, and arbitrators’ powers to award 
wage increases, and otherwise restrict the activities of public sector unions. A 
police-specific example is the recent change to the New Jersey Fire and 
Police Arbitration Act, which limits annual base salary increases awarded to 
police and fire personnel through arbitration to an average of 2 per cent, while 
also significantly reducing the time-frame for bargaining.64 A major driver of 
such changes is an underlying assumption that third-party intervention means 
that employers lose the ability to contain wage outcomes on ‘ability to pay’ 
                                                 
61 Office of Manpower Economics, Arbitration <http://www.ome.uk.com/downloads/ 
arbitration.doc>; Susan Corby, ‘Public Sector Disputes and Third Party Intervention’ 
(Research Paper 02/03, Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 2003) 2. Corby cites 
pay determination for the UK police — where the government also has explicit power to, inter 
alia, set issues into the agenda for the PNB — as a classic example of ‘overt and formal’ 
predominance by the employer. 
62 See Vincent Keter, ‘Police Pay — Booth Review’ (Briefing Paper 2008/11, House of 
Commons, 5 December 2011). Corby notes that the only other time a PNB recommendation 
was rejected was in 1989 and this was signalled well in advance: Corby, above n 61, 16; see 
also Hawke, above n 13. It would appear that, as with similar Pay Review Bodies in the UK, 
the government has the final say in such matters: Corby, above n 61, 15–16.  
63 See Richard B Freeman and Eunice Han, ‘The War against Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining in the US’ (2012) 54(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 386, 391–3, outlining the 
major reforms in the US states of Wisconsin and Ohio. See further, Anthony Mapp, 
‘Arbitration Reform Bill A-3393: New Jersey’s Dramatic Change in Compulsory Interest 
Arbitration’ (2012) 9(2) Rutgers Conflict Resolution Law Journal <http://pegasus. 
rutgers.edu/~rcrlj/articlespdf/Mapp.pdf>; Jeff Mitchell, ‘The Next Chapter: Public Sector 
Wage Restraint Debate Continues’, Mondaq Business Briefing (online), 16 October 2012 
<http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/201664/employee+rights+labour+relations/The+Next+ 
Chapter+Public+Sector+Wage+Restraint+Debate+Continues>. Australian public sector 
workers have not been immune from these trends: see Giuseppe Carabetta, ‘Public Sector 
“Wages-Cap”: The New Framework for the Determination of Public Sector Wages and 
Conditions in New South Wales’ (2012) 25(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 65, 
discussing changes to the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) effectively limiting the 
arbitral tribunal’s powers to increase public sector labour costs beyond 2.5 per cent. Police 
and other public safety employees have on occasion been exempted from the changes. 
64 See Mapp, above n 63. 
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grounds.65 However, such predominance by the employer in pay 
determination processes runs contrary to the purpose of the police arbitration 
statutes. It is also unquestionably contrary to the ILO’s requirement of having 
in place ‘fair and impartial’ arbitration principles to counterbalance the loss of 
the right to strike. 
IV THE PRINCIPAL OPTIONS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
This review of the different models shows that there is a variety of approaches 
to the rules governing bargaining and arbitration for police. The variations 
reflect the need to preserve the essentiality of police and other emergency 
services, to allow them to enjoy the same essential safeguards as other 
employees, and — increasingly — to curb public spending. These same 
variations reflect the difficulty in reaching and indeed implementing a single 
set of solutions for police pay-setting.66 However, despite the variation, it is 
clear that, in jurisdictions with police-specific bargaining regimes, the right to 
bargain is often supported by compulsory arbitration as a counterbalance to 
the loss of the right to strike. The clear advantage of compulsory arbitration is 
that it provides a means of resolving bargaining impasses.67  
The current Fair Work bargaining framework seeks to reconcile a right for 
essential service workers to take limited industrial action, with a right to 
binding arbitration.68 This represents a progressive approach for essential 
services. Similarly, the ILO itself has asked whether it is worth considering 
the possibility of avoiding a total ban on strikes in essential services by 
ensuring a minimum level of service.69 A minimalist option under the FW Act 
would be to retain the current model but to expressly authorise police officers 
to take limited industrial action, in order to clarify their right to take protected 
action under the Act. The advantage of this approach would be that it is 
consistent with the previous Australian practice of police officers engaging in 
                                                 
65 A number of studies on public sector bargaining have shown this assumption to be open to 
question, suggesting the main drivers for the limitations appear to be political and ideological: 
see Freeman and Han, above n 63. 
66 Cf ILO Public Emergency Services, above n 34, referring to the public emergency services 
generally. 
67 See Carrell and Bales, above n 39.  
68 McCrystal, above n 20, 190. 
69 As earlier suggested by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations: ILO Public Emergency Services, above n 34, 103. 
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limited forms of industrial action.70 It would also promote symmetry between 
police officers’ bargaining practices and those of other employees.71  
However, providing police officers with direct authorisation to engage in 
protected action would raise the difficult question of how to properly define 
the scope of allowable industrial action. It would also raise complex issues as 
to how the right to protected action would interact with police officers’ 
obligations under relevant policing legislation. Further, without more, the 
problems relating to the practical limitations on police and emergency 
services workers taking protected industrial action would remain, as would 
the problems relating to limited access to arbitration under the Act.  
It is this kind of issue that has prompted Justice Boland to suggest that 
consideration be given to a US-style ‘mandatory interest arbitration’72 model 
for emergency services workers under the FW Act.73 Given that mandatory 
interest arbitration can provide a solution to bargaining impasses, the concept 
warrants further examination. Its major strength is that it does not replace 
collective bargaining; rather, it offers a solution when the conditions for 
productive collective bargaining have broken down.74 As Forsyth has pointed 
out, a number of important policy issues would need to be resolved before 
mandatory interest arbitration could be introduced, including whether access 
to arbitration should be automatic, or apply after set time periods, or whether 
the current ‘bad-faith’ test should be made easier to satisfy.75 However, in a 
policing context, a mandatory interest arbitration model would be simpler to 
implement, for not only would it provide a closure mechanism for bargaining 
disputes, but (coupled with an absolute bar on strikes) it would prevent the 
                                                 
70 In 2006, a review team in New Zealand highlighted the point that ‘precedents can be found 
[in particular] in several Australian jurisdictions where police officers have access to limited 
forms of industrial action’: Police Act Review Team (NZ), ‘Employment Arrangements’ 
(Issue Paper No 3, New Zealand Police, August 2006) 6, 14–16. As noted earlier, such actions 
have generally included working-to-rule and bans on speeding or traffic fines and the like. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Mandatory interest arbitration, as used in the US, is the process whereby the arbitrator 
determines some or all of the terms the parties are to have in their collective bargaining 
agreement when negotiations have been unsuccessful. The process is usually coupled with an 
absolute bar on strikes for the affected workers. 
73 Boland, above n 4, [35], focusing in particular on the limitations on industrial action for 
emergency service workers, and endorsing the earlier observations of Forsyth; Forsyth, above 
n 4, on the advantages of US and Canadian models of mandatory interest arbitration. 
74 Forsyth, above n 4; Boland, above n 4, [32]. 
75 Forsyth, above n 4, referring to workers generally. 
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problem of conflict between a right to protected action and the relevant Police 
Acts.76  
The concern with introducing mandatory interest arbitration — leaving aside 
obvious political obstacles77 — is that it may lead the parties to rely on third-
party intervention and undermine bargaining (the so-called ‘chilling’ and 
‘narcotic’ effects). However, research into police bargaining systems has 
shown that such effects depend on the precise enabling measures in place, 
including the form of compulsory interest arbitration.78 One form of 
mandatory interest arbitration may be FOA, as used in various forms in 
Canada, New Zealand, and the US.79 As noted, FOA can offer the advantages 
of conventional interest arbitration while simultaneously avoiding its 
‘perils’.80 It is particularly advantageous where — as in the case of emergency 
services — the traditional economic weapons of strike and lock-out are 
unavailable and the parties are in a ‘locked-in’ relationship, making it difficult 
to determine value on the open market.81 A number of US studies have shown 
that, compared to other dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and 
conventional arbitration, FOA offers at least four advantages: 
• FOA encourages the parties to present more reasonable, middle-
ground offers because the arbitrator must choose the more 
reasonable of the two offers. 
• FOA provides a strong incentive to the parties to settle during the 
pre-hearing stage. 
• It provides finality — it can provide public officials with a 
binding decision in a bargaining dispute, which can then be 
implemented during a new budget cycle. 
                                                 
76 Nor would the broader question as to how a right to industrial action interacts with interest 
arbitration: ibid. 
77 Boland, above n 4, [29]–[30], [39]. He refers to the ‘vociferous’ opposition from employers 
and political obstacles to any suggestion of even last resort arbitration in respect of bargaining 
disputes. The recent Fair Work Review has also rejected a general expansion of Fair Work 
Australia’s arbitration powers: Ron McCallum, Michael Moore and John Edwards, Towards 
More Productive and Equitable Workplaces (Review Report prepared for the Minister for 
Employment and Workplace Relations, Australian Government, 15 June 2012) 146–8. 
78 See, for example, the discussion on the system of final-offer mediation–arbitration used to 
settle police bargaining disputes in New Zealand: McAndrew, above n 49. McAndrew argues 
that the New Zealand experience supports earlier research denying the inevitability of a 
‘narcotic’ dependence on arbitration. 
79 FOA has also been used in Britain although mainly in respect of prison officers. 
80 Carrell and Bales, above n 39; Lok, above n 46.  
81 Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 6–7, 24. 
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• It avoids the politically unpalatable prospect offered by 
conventional arbitration of an unelected arbitrator drafting the 
parties’ agreement.82  
Carrell and Bales acknowledge the ‘common criticism’ of FOA, namely, that 
there is a possibility that neither party will present a reasonable package, 
meaning that the arbitrator must choose between two unreasonable offers.83 
However, respondents to this criticism argue that the likelihood of the parties 
adopting unreasonable offers is small, given that FOA essentially rewards the 
more reasonable proposal and punishes the extreme proposal.84 Others argue 
that using an issue-by-issue approach, as distinct from a ‘package’ approach, 
can offer at least a partial solution. Further, according to Carrell and Bales, 
research on FOA models suggests that the more transparent the FOA process 
(for example, where it imposes an obligation on the parties to disclose their 
final offers to the other side), ‘the more reasonable the parties’ proposals will 
be and the more likely the dispute is to settle’.85  
Most FOA statutes require that the parties engage in some alternative dispute 
resolution procedure prior to the initiation of formal arbitration. Many further 
require that these processes result either in a settlement or in the parties 
submitting a final offer. The obvious benefit of the incentive to settle is that 
this can encourage negotiated agreements. If no agreement is reached, the 
arbitration process begins in a timely manner.86 As noted earlier, under most 
FOA models, such as that in New Zealand, a mediation–arbitration process is 
applied.87 While structural and environmental factors must play a part, the 
experience of applying New Zealand’s mediation–arbitration FOA model 
supports earlier US-based research denying any inevitable ‘chilling’ effect, 
and seeing the availability of mandatory arbitration as enhancing the 
effectiveness of prior non-coercive processes.88  
                                                 
82 Ibid, citing a number of US examples. Australian commentators, such as Dr Graham Smith, 
also support a FOA approach as a ‘circuit breaker’ for at least some kinds of bargaining 
disputes: see Boland, above n 4, [36]–[37].  
83 Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 23. See further Lok, above n 46. Another criticism of FOA is 
that in limiting the arbitrator’s discretion it can be inflexible: Corby, above n 61, 28. 
84 Martin, above n 42, 72–3. 
85 Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 23. 
86 Martin, above n 42, 97. Under some police FOA models, the parties are allowed to mutually 
agree on a type of arbitration (conventional or FOA), or a particular type of FOA (eg, single 
issue or package). The alternatives may also vary depending on the prior dispute resolution 
procedure applied (eg, mediation or fact-finding): at 76–7.  
87 Ibid 106: Martin refers to mediation–arbitration as a ‘hallmark’ of final offer systems. As 
noted above, the New Zealand model represents a unique variation on the traditional model. 
88 McAndrew, above n 49. 
2013 POLICE BARGAINING DISPUTES 83 
The timing of submissions of final offers also seems to be an important factor 
in encouraging bargaining. Evidence from the US suggests that encouraging 
parties to submit final offers as early as possible prior to arbitration, and then 
allowing an early ‘grace period’ in which the parties continue to negotiate 
before formal hearings begin, provides the parties with an incentive to 
negotiate their own settlements.89 According to Carrell and Bales, allowing 
the parties to extend this grace period and possibly agree on single issues until 
an award is issued provides an additional incentive to form last-minute 
agreements.90 This also seems consistent with evidence showing that the mere 
existence of last-resort arbitration in a bargaining context has a ‘shadow 
effect’, leading the parties to negotiate their own outcomes in most cases.91  
Serious consideration should also be given to the range of matters that may be 
subject to arbitration. The limiting of negotiable topics can actually make 
bargaining more (and not less) difficult, especially under economic conditions 
where workers are able to use wages and other bargaining subjects as a 
‘proxy’ to obtain gains in other areas.92 To what extent the practice of 
excluding topics is properly grounded in the uniqueness of police work also 
seems questionable, now that many police employment conditions 
substantially reflect general employment conditions.93 One concern is that it 
can be difficult to draw a line between police ‘employment’ and ‘policy’ 
matters.94 Moreover, the fact that the exclusions are described in broad terms 
only exacerbates this problem.95 Whatever its effects on bargaining, the 
limiting of negotiable topics certainly favours the employer, and, unlike other 
employees, police officers are not able to influence the scope of such matters 
by striking. A minimal option would be to at least spell out the types of 
operational situations where exemptions apply, rather than using the usual 
‘shopping list’ approach. But even then, complementary alternative regulatory 
measures would need to be put into place to ensure that there were no ‘gaps’ 
in the regulatory framework.96  
                                                 
89 See Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 25. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See Forsyth and Stewart, above n 7, 27 where they refer to empirical evidence on the effects 
of first-contract arbitration models in Canadian jurisdictions, in support of an argument for an 
increased role for arbitration in Australia.  
92 Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 20, citing various studies suggesting the narrowing of 
bargaining topics can lead to unstable bargaining relationships and even limit performance. 
93 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 279. 
94 ILO Public Emergency Services, above n 34, 98–9. 
95 See Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 273–4. 
96 See further Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 274–5. 
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Law-makers would also need to carefully consider the statutory criteria for 
arbitration, including requirements to consider the interests of the community, 
the state of the economy, and the capacity of the employer to pay. This would 
include, in the case of police officers, consideration of government and 
department budgets. As noted above, the need to control public expenditure 
has meant that the focus is now firmly on ‘ability to pay’ issues.97 A recent 
(extreme) Australian example is the New South Wales ‘wages-cap’ 
legislation, which effectively ‘caps’ the arbitral tribunal’s powers to increase 
public sector labour costs at 2.5 per cent.98 The clear intention of such 
schemes is to unilaterally alter the conditions under which arbitration occurs 
in favour of the employer, something which is clearly inconsistent with the 
ILO’s requirements for an effective, impartial arbitration procedure. The 
question of how such a change might affect the community is also relevant.99 
A US study on how police officers responded to changes in compensation 
found that police performance declined dramatically when arbitrators ruled 
against the police union.100 Further, if the parties are to have confidence in the 
arbitration system, its impartiality needs to be retained. A wages-cap 
requirement can undermine this goal, partly because the arbitrator’s decision-
making powers are greatly diminished, but also because police officers’ 
ability to bargain is diminished. For these reasons, a wages-cap requirement 
should be avoided or a fairer and more neutral ‘ability to pay’ criterion should 
be used, taking account of both police officers’ and taxpayers’ interests.101  
V CONCLUDING REMARKS  
A number of the recent commentaries calling for a re-examination of the rules 
for access to arbitration under the FW Act note that, in the US, mandatory 
interest arbitration is especially prevalent amongst public essential services.102 
Similarly, as the present study has shown, in many overseas jurisdictions 
                                                 
97 See the examples cited in Carabetta, ‘Wages Cap’, above n 63. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Cf Mapp, above n 63, discussing similar ‘salary-cap’ reforms to the New Jersey Police and 
Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 425, NJ Stat Ann, 34:13A–
16(g). 
100 Cited in Mapp, above n 63, 16–7. The same study, according to Mapp, found that union 
losses are associated with a 5.5 per cent increase in reported crime rates in the months 
following arbitration.  
101 A similar recommendation was made to the New Zealand Police Association in response to 
a government proposal in relation to the New Zealand Police arbitration system in 2001: 
Anderson, above n 60. A further safeguard would be to require the arbitrator (and parties 
themselves) to give a detailed account of the potential impact of a higher or lower award on 
government programs, on other employees, and on taxpayers: Martin, above n 42, 99–100. 
102 In particular, Forsyth, above n 4; Boland, above n 4. 
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where police have established collective bargaining systems, this is supported 
by compulsory arbitration as a counterbalance to the loss of the right to strike. 
Forsyth also makes the point that, despite the prevalence of mandatory interest 
arbitration in most public sector employment in the US, in the private sector, 
bargaining arbitration is only voluntary, and that this is in line with the US 
free enterprise system.103  
The approach in Australia, by contrast, has been to simply group police with 
other workers under the FW Act, making exceptions based on operational and 
essential services grounds. No consideration has been given to issues relating 
to police pay determination, including the potential limits on industrial 
action.104 The problem is that, with limited access to arbitration, police 
officers are left without a guaranteed closure mechanism. While there will not 
be a return to a compulsory arbitration system in Australia,105 it is legitimate 
to ask whether there is scope for at least some form of mandatory interest 
arbitration for police.106 It is no coincidence that most Western countries with 
established police bargaining systems have separate, arbitral procedures in 
place. In Australia, this occurs only in respect of the Northern Territory 
Police, who operate under a specialist police arbitral tribunal model.107 
The advantage of mandatory interest arbitration over other dispute resolution 
methods such as mediation and conciliation is that it can be used to resolve 
bargaining impasses, and therefore prevent the escalation of bargaining 
disputes into strikes or other power bargaining tactics.108 Furthermore, the 
threat of an imposed outcome focuses the parties’ minds on the need to reach 
agreement.109 As verified by empirical evidence mandatory interest arbitration 
is not a ‘substitute’ for collective bargaining. Rather, it is a tool to be used 
where the conditions for productive negotiation have broken down — 
                                                 
103 Forsyth, above n 4. 
104 This is despite submissions of the Police Federation of Australia and recognition by a Senate 
Committee of Inquiry of the need to address a number of defects in the Fair Work system as it 
applies to police: see Carabetta, ‘Fair Work’, above n 2, 280. 
105 Boland, above n 4, [30]. See further the discussion above n 77. 
106 Even the harshest critics of compulsory arbitration have rarely called for its abolition for 
police officers: Martin, above n 42, 99. As noted, in other jurisdictions (such as New Zealand) 
where there has been a similar move away from arbitration to enterprise bargaining, police 
have retained an arbitration system. In the United Kingdom, arbitration is compulsory for 
police officers, but not for fire fighters: Corby, above n 61, 17.  
107 Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) pt III divs 1–2. 
108 A large body of research shows that the availability of arbitration substantially reduces the 
incidence of police strikes: McAndrew Review, above n 26, 33. 
109 A large body of empirical evidence supports this: see, eg, Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 11; 
Forsyth, above n 4; Forsyth and Stewart, above n 7. 
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something that, as confirmed by recent experience, is more likely during 
difficult economic times.110  
Final-offer arbitration, a form of mandatory interest arbitration used in police 
jurisdictions in the US, Canada and New Zealand, also guarantees settlement 
of bargaining impasses, providing a stronger incentive to the parties to reach 
agreement than conventional arbitration does and potentially minimising its 
chilling effect.111 Further, because the arbitrator must choose the more 
reasonable of the parties’ final offers, FOA encourages the parties to negotiate 
towards the ‘middle-ground’ rather than to adopt polar positions.112 Despite 
its relatively limited use to date,113 research suggests that FOA enhances the 
effectiveness of non-coercive processes such as conciliation and mediation 
and thereby produces stable bargaining relationships. A police-specific 
example is the New Zealand FOA model.114  
Law-makers, governments and police associations considering adopting FOA 
as a means of resolving police bargaining disputes would need to consider 
several issues: (1) the possible adoption of FOA instead of conventional 
arbitration in instances where further negotiation is unlikely to be productive; 
(2) the inclusion of mandatory mediation by the Fair Work tribunal (or 
another mediator) for a fixed time period, to increase the probability of pre-
hearing agreements; (3) together with mandatory mediation, a grace period 
before the hearing during which the parties, after making their final offers, can 
continue to negotiate; (4) the adoption of an ‘issue-by-issue’ versus a ‘total 
package’ form of FOA; (5) the specification of the range, if any, of bargaining 
exclusions (and the basis for those exclusions), and of complementary 
alternative measures; (6) the specification of the criteria for the arbitrator to 
consider, including the state of the economy and the employer’s ‘capacity to 
                                                 
110 Forsyth, above n 4. 
111 Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 27, discussing FOA in a general public sector context. 
112 Ibid 12. Carrell and Bales draw a comparison here with FOA as used for Major League 
Baseball players in the US: ‘If [conventional] arbitration was used, the parties might fear an 
arbitrator would simply split the difference [and] this would encourage the parties to take 
polar positions in negotiations … In baseball arbitration, however, the parties have the 
opposite incentive — they have every incentive to make a reasonable proposal ... This 
undoubtedly explains why the majority of cases settle before arbitration’: at 15. 
113 Ibid. Few public sector statutes permit FOA, even in the United States. It has not hitherto 
been used in Australia; however, some commentators have expressed support for a limited 
form of last-offer arbitration as a ‘circuit breaker’ for negotiations concerning Greenfield 
agreements: See, eg, Graham Smith, Submission to the Fair Work Act Review Panel, Fair 
Work Act Review, February 2012. The Fair Work Review made a similar recommendation 
concerning such agreements (only): McCallum, Moore and Edwards, above n 77. 
114 See McAndrew, above n 49. 
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pay’, provided that the arbitrator is required to take into account both police 
officers’ and taxpayers’ interests.115  
Of these, consideration (1) is the most profound because moving to an FOA 
system would be an unprecedented development in police pay determination 
in Australia. Regarding consideration (6), uncertainty over the strength of the 
economic recovery will mean that ‘ability to pay’ will remain the focus. There 
may be a temptation to impose a ceiling or wages-cap — à la New South 
Wales and other jurisdictions.116 Nevertheless, while such limits may have a 
certain appeal, they clearly stack the deck in favour of the employer in a way 
that defies the FW Act’s good faith bargaining principles and the ILO’s 
requirement for a ‘fair and impartial’ arbitration system. Nor, for the reasons 
outlined relating to the potential adverse effects on police productivity and the 
community’s safety, are they likely to serve the public interest in the long 
term. 
                                                 
115 Cf Martin, above n 42, 99–102; Carrell and Bales, above n 39, 27. Regarding considerations 
(1) to (3), relating to the question of access to arbitration, Forsyth and Stewart identify various 
other models of first contract arbitration for private sector disputes in Canada, including: (1) a 
‘fault’/‘exceptional remedy’ model — where referrals are made by the Minister of Labour, 
based on a demonstrated good faith bargaining breach by either party; (2) a ‘no fault’ model 
— a party seeking arbitration may apply directly, by demonstrating that bargaining has been 
dysfunctional; and (3) an ‘automatic access’ model — if no agreement is reached after 90 
days, the arbitrator must determine the dispute within 60 days: Forsyth and Stewart, above 
n 7, 27. 
116 See, eg, Mapp, above n 63. 
